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ESTATES AND TRUSTS
JOHN D. LAFLIN* AND GARY D. EISENBERG**
This section of the Survey deals with New Mexico appellate court cases
addressing issues of estate and trust law. Five cases decided during the
Survey period considered issues of recurring importance.' These issues
include questions of will construction, testamentary intent, pretermitted
children, undue influence, omitted spouses, and will execution. Most of
these decisions involved the interpretation of the New Mexico Probate
Code.'
I. WILL CONSTRUCTION
AND TESTAMENTARY INTENT
Two New Mexico cases decided during the Survey period involved
construction of wills and interpretation of testamentary intent. In New
Mexico Boys Ranch, Inc. v. Hanvey,3 the supreme court dealt with the
issue of whether a decedent died intestate. Decedent's will provided that
upon her death, her mother should inherit all her property. A separate
clause provided that in the event that decedent and her mother died
simultaneously, or under circumstances causing doubt as to who survived
the other, then the bequest to decedent's mother would lapse and the New
Mexico Boys Ranch would receive all of decedent's property.4 Decedent's
will also included a no-contest clause which stated that persons estab-
*John D. Laflin & Associates, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico
**Notes and Comments Editor, New Mexico Law Review, 1983-84
1. One other estate law case, Bowman v. Butler, 98 N.M. 357, 648 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1982),
was decided during the Survey period. Bowman, which deals with estate and fiduciary administration,
is limited to its facts and is not considered in this section.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§45-1-101 to 45-7-401 (1978).
3. 97 N.M. 771, 643 P.2d 857 (1982).
4. The FOURTH clause of decedent's will read as follows:
In the event that my death should occur simultaneously with my beloved mother,
Mary M. Martin, or approximately so, or in the same common accident or calamity,
or under circumstances causing doubt as to which of us survived the other, then it
is to be presumed that my said mother, Mary M. Martin, died first, and the paragraph
herein denominated second shall lapse and be inoperative, and I then give, devise
and bequest all of the rest, remainder and residue of my estate, real, personal or
mixed, wheresoever situated, which I may own or be entitled to at the time of my
death, to the New Mexico Boys Ranch, Belen, New Mexico.
Id. at 772, 643 P.2d at 858.
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lishing a right to inherit were to receive one dollar.' Decedent's will,
however, did not provide expressly for the situation in which decedent
would survive her mother. In Hanvey, the decedent survived her mother
by more than six years. 6
The district court determined that decedent died testate, leaving her
entire estate to the New Mexico Boys Ranch. 7 The court of appeals
reversed this judgment, and held that decedent died intestate. This holding
entitled decedent's first cousin to receive the entire estate.' On appeal,
the supreme court reversed, and held that the intent of the decedent must
be determined by considering the will as a whole.' Furthermore, the
supreme court held that in construing a will, there is a presumption in
favor of testacy and against intestacy.o Based on these two findings, the
court determined that the decedent clearly intended to bequeath all of her
property, and that no one, other than the designated beneficiaries, should
take any of her estate.11 The court ruled that the only other designated
beneficiary, the New Mexico Boys Ranch, was entitled to decedent's
estate because decedent's mother could not take the estate. " This decision
indicates, at least in cases where the court wants to avoid an intestacy
ruling, that the intent of a testator will be construed liberally.
The second case involving the construction of a will and the interpre-
tation of a testator's intent was Portales National Bank v. Bellin. 3 In
Bellin, the court of appeals dealt with the issue of whether the term
"children," as used in a decedent's will, included grandchildren. De-
cedent provided in his will that the Portales National Bank should receive
all of his property in trust. Decedent's will further provided that the
proceeds of the trust should be distributed to five of his brothers and
sisters.14 Finally, decedent's will stated that if any of the named brothers
5. The SEVENTH clause of decedent's will provided in pertinent part:
Should any person or persons-other than my beloved mother, Mary M. Martin,
establish a right to inherit from me or against my estate of any character whatsoever,
or in any matter whatever, then and in the event I hereby give and bequeath unto
such person or persons the sum of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) each, which shall con-
stitute the only share of any such person or persons in my estate.
Id.
6. Id. at 775, 643 P.2d at 861.
7. Id. at 772, 643 P.2d at 858.
8. Id. The court of appeals determined that decedent's will contemplated only two possible
situations: (i) that her mother would survive her or (2) that she and her mother would die simul-
taneously. It did not provide for the situation in which decedent survived her mother. Therefore,
despite the court of appeals' sympathies with the Boys Ranch, the court held that decedent died
intestate. See Matter of Estate of Martin, 97 N.M. 773, 643 P.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1981).
9. 97 N.M. at 773, 643 P.2d at 859.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 98 N.M. 113, 645 P.2d 986 (Ct. App. 1982).
14. Decedent's will did not provide for his four other brothers and sisters. Id. at 115, 645 P.2d
at 988.
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and sisters predeceased decedent, then that sibling's interest would pass
to his or her children.15 All but one of the named beneficiaries died before
the decedent.
On appeal, the grandchildren of one of the deceased beneficiaries,
whose father also was deceased, claimed that the word "children" in
decedent's will should include grandchildren. 6 A similar claim was made
by the adopted grandchild of a sister of decedent who was not named as
a beneficiary in decedent's will. 7
The court of appeals held that decedent's will was not ambiguous as
to the term "children," and that extrinsic evidence was not admissible
to vary the customary and normal meaning of the word. 8 Moreover, the
court stated that the definition of "children" in the New Mexico Probate
Code does not include grandchildren. 9 The court held, therefore, that
the grandchildren of decedent's brothers and sisters were not entitled to
share in decedent's estate, regardless of whether the brother or sister was
named as a beneficiary in decedent's will.2'
In a separate issue, the court in Bellin determined that the anti-lapse
statute was not applicable.2' The court held that the anti-lapse statute is
only applicable to the issue of a devisee, and that in this case the devisee
was the trustee, not the beneficiary.22 Therefore, the beneficiaries were
not entitled to take under the anti-lapse statute.23
In contrast to the supreme court's decision in Hanvey, the court of
appeals in Bellin strictly construed the intent of the testator. This con-
struction is in accord with the court of appeals' decision in Hanvey,24
15. Paragraph three of decedent's will provided in applicable part:
If any of said brothers and sisters predecease me, the interest that would have
gone to such Beneficiary under this my Last Will and Testament shall pass to and
vest in his or her children in the amount that the brother or sister would have
taken if said Beneficiary had survived me, such share to be equally divided among
the children of any brother or sister who fails to survive me.
Id. at 115, 645 P.2d at 988.
16. Id. at 116, 645 P.2d at 989.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 117, 645 P.2d at 990.
19. Id. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-1-201(3) (1978) defines "child" to exclude any person who is only
a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant.
20. Id. at 118, 645 P.2d at 991.
21. The anti-lapse statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-605 (1978), provides that:
"If a devisee, who is related to the testator by kinship, . . . fails to survive
the testator . . . the issue of the deceased devisee who survive the testator by
one hundred twenty hours take in place of the deceased devisee. (emphasis
added.)
22. 98 N.M. at 118, 645 P.2d at 991. The court relied on N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-1-201(7) (1978)
which provides as follows:
"In the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, . . . the trust or trustee
is the devisee and the beneficiaries are not devisees."
23. Id. If there was no trust involved in this case, clearly the anti-lapse statute would have allowed
the grandchildren of the brother named in decedent's will to share decedent's estate.
24. See supra note 8.
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which was reversed by the supreme court.25 The estate lawyer should be
aware of this conflict, and should realize that without a consistent stan-
dard, testators' intentions will be construed in the future on a case-by-
case basis.
1I. PRETERMITTED CHILDREN
In Matter of Estate of Hilton,26 the court of appeals considered the
issue of whether a no-contest clause in a will was sufficient to disinherit
issue of one's child under the New Mexico Probate Code. In Hilton,
testator died on August 2, 1980, leaving a will dated August 30, 1972.27
Testator had four children; one child, however, predeceased testator and
died prior to the execution of the will. In his will, testator left his wife
a life estate in a home and other monies, and left the bulk of his estate
to his three surviving daughters. 28 The predeceased child was not men-
tioned or provided for in testator's will. Testator's will also included a
no-contest clause stating that any person claiming to be a child or heir
would receive one dollar.29
The children of testator's deceased son appealed the district court's
order denying them an intestate share of testator's estate as pretermitted
heirs.3" The court of appeals first stated that the New Mexico pretermitted
children statute provides that the omission of a child from a will is
presumed to be unintentional .3' The court further stated, however, that
the presumption against disinheritance could be rebutted, and that ex-
trinsic evidence is admissible to rebut the presumption.3 2 The court then
concluded that to disinherit a child in a will under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-
2-302(A)(1) (1978), a clause in the will either must mention the child
by name, or fairly and clearly express an intention on the part of the
testator to exclude the child.34
25. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
26. 98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1982).
27. Id. at 421, 649 P.2d at 489.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 422, 649 P.2d at 490.
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-302 (1978) provides as follows:
A. If a testator fails to name or provide in his will for any of his children born
or adopted before or after the execution of his will, the omitted child or his issue
receives a share in the estate equal in value to that which he would have received
if the testator had died intestate unless:
(1) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional .... (emphasis
added.)
31. 98 N.M. at 424, 649 P.2d at 492.
32. Id. at 425, 649 P.2d at 493.
33. See supra note 30.
34. 98 N.M. at 427, 649 P.2d at 495.
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The court of appeals held that the no-contest clause in testator's will
was sufficient to disinherit the children of testator's deceased son. 35 The
court reasoned that the phrase in testator's will stating that any other
person claiming to be a child or heir shall receive one dollar, amounted
to an expression by the testator of an intention to exclude the testator's
grandchildren as heirs from taking under his will. 36
The language of the Hilton decision indicates that the omitted children
of a testator, whether alive or deceased when the testator's will is exe-
cuted, are presumed to be pretermitted heirs. The court belies this pre-
sumption, however, by holding that a simple no-contest clause, included
as boiler-plate in many wills, disinherits the omitted children. This de-
cision ignores the intent behind the New Mexico pretermitted child statute
that the omission of a child in a will is presumed to be unintentional. 37
III. UNDUE INFLUENCE AND OMITTED SPOUSES
In Matter of Estate of Elbelt,38 the court of appeals considered the issue
of whether the New Mexico omitted spouse statute39 invalidated a post-
marital testamentary disposition procurred by the exercise of undue in-
fluence by the omitted spouse. In Elbelt, the testator at age ninety-one
married Rutland, the appellant. The testator had no children or grand-
35. Id. But see Matter of Estate of Seymour, 93 N.M. 328, 600 P.2d 274 (1979), which held
that no-contest clauses, although valid and enforceable, are not effective to disinherit a party who
has contested a will in good faith and with probable cause to believe that the will was invalid.
36. Id. The courts of other jurisdictions are not in accord as to whether a no-contest clause in a
will is sufficient to disinherit children not specifically mentioned in the will. See Goff v. Goff, 352
Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944); In re Ray's Estate, 69 Nev. 204, 245 P.2d 990 (1952) (a clause
in a will leaving a nominal sum to anyone who claimed to be an heir or contests the will is not
sufficient to disinherit one's child or that child's issue); compare In re Benolken's Estate, 122 Mont.
425, 205 P.2d 1141 (1949) with Estate of Szekely, 104 Cal. App. 3d 236, 163 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1980)
(a clause in a will leaving a nominal sum to anyone who claims to be an heir or contests the will
is sufficient to disinherit one's child or that child's issue). The court of appeals, however, determined
that the California pretermitted heir statute was substantially similar to the New Mexico statute such
that California case law should govern the result in the Hilton case. Id. at 426, 649 P.2d at 494.
The court of appeals relied on In re McClure's Estate, 214 Cal. App. 2d 590, 29 Cal. Rptr. 569
(1963), which held that a no-contest clause in a will constitutes an adequate statement of the testator's
intention to disinherit children not specifically mentioned in a will.
37. For a more thorough discussion of the problem of omitted children, see T. Atkinson, Law of
Wills, § 36 at 141 (2d. ed. 1953).
38. 99 N.M. 229, 656 P.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1982).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-301(A) (1978) provides as follows:
If a testator fails to provide by will for the surviving spouse who married the
testator after the execution of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same
share of the estate he would have received if the decedent left no will unless it
appears from the will that the omission was intentional, or the testator provided
for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in
lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the testator or from
the amount of the transfer or other evidence. (emphasis added.)
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children from previous marriages. Shortly after the marriage in 1980,
testator executed a will leaving all his property in fee to Rutland, except
for a certain property, which testator left to Rutland in a life estate, with
the remainder to pass to Rutland's children.
Scanlan, the appellee and testator's nephew, contested the will alleging
undue influence.' Scanlan also filed a petition seeking formal probate of
testator's prior will executed in 1971, which bequeathed Scanlan a portion
of decedent's estate. During the trial, Rutland moved to bar Scanlan from
presenting any evidence of undue influence, arguing that the evidence
was irrelevant because she was entitled to testator's entire estate as an
omitted spouse, even if the claim was true. 4' The trial court denied
Rutland's motion, and the court of appeals granted an interlocutory re-
view.42
The court of appeals held that the lower court correctly denied Rutland's
motion. 43 The court reasoned that the lower court is required to determine
the validity of every testamentary document and which persons are entitled
to decedent's property under any testamentary document filed for pro-
bate.' The court held that the evidence of undue influence was admissible,
because testator's 1980 will made dispositions to persons other than
Rutland.45
More importantly, however, the court of appeals held that if a testator
is competent to enter into a valid marriage, the omitted spouse statute
still controls, even if the omitted spouse exercised undue influence so as
to invalidate a later testamentary disposition. 46 This decision recognizes
the presumption that the omission of a spouse from a will is unintentional.
As a result of this decision, however, the lower court must look at evidence
of the testator's capacity to marry and at evidence of the testator's capacity
to execute a later will. A significant amount of time can pass between
these two events, such that it is possible that the testator was competent
to marry, but not competent to execute a will some years later because
his or her spouse exercised undue influence. In this instance, the Elbert
decision still would allow the testator's spouse to inherit as an omitted
spouse if a pre-marital will was executed and admitted to probate. Cer-
tainly, the Legislature did not enact the omitted spouse statute to reward
the testator's spouse under these circumstances.
40. 99 N.M. at 231, 656 P.2d at 894.
41. Id. Note that Rutland's omitted spouse argument is valid only if the 1971 will was admitted
to probate, because the omitted spouse statute, supra note 39, is only applicable to spouses omitted
from pre-marital wills.
42. Id. at 230, 656 P.2d at 893.
43. Id. at 233, 656 P.2d at 896.
44. Id. at 231, 656 P.2d at 894.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 232, 656 P.2d at 895.
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IV. WILL EXECUTION
In Matter of Estate of Kelly,47 the court of appeals considered the issues
of whether a decedent's will was executed and witnessed properly and
whether the decedent intended the instrument to constitute his will.48 The
decedent, while hospitalized, directed his cousin, Mills, to prepare a
handwritten will. Mills requested two strangers to witness the will and
Mills signed the will for decedent, purportedly at his direction and re-
quest. 49 Decedent's nephew filed a petition seeking to have a previous
will executed by decedent admitted to probate, a motion seeking to have
the handwritten will declared invalid, and a motion seeking summary
judgment." The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment,
and Mills appealed."
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, and held that there were
genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the will was executed
properly and duly witnessed and whether the decedent intended the in-
strument as his will. 2 In reaching this decision, the court enumerated
several factors to be considered when drafting wills. First, the court held
that when a testator directs that an individual sign a will on his behalf,
N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-502(B) (1978)" 3 requires publication or some
manifestation by the testator that the individual is signing the instrument
"at [the testator's] request as and for his last will and testament." 5 4 The
court stated, however, that no particular form of publication is required;
there need not be an express spoken declaration, and it is sufficient that
the testator, by words or conduct, signifies to the witnesses in some
manner that the instrument is his will. 55 Furthermore, the court stated a
declaration that the instrument to be witnessed is the will of the testator
may be made by one other than the testator if the testator indicates his
agreement. 56
47. 99 N.M. 482, 660 P.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1983).
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-502 (1978) provides as follows:
A. Every will shall be in writing, signed by the testator or in the testator's name
by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and attested
in the presence of the testator by two or more credible witnesses; and
B. the witnesses to a will must be present, see the testator sign the will, or one
sign it for him at his request as and for his last will and testament, and must sign
as witnesses in his presence and in the presence of each other.
49. 99 N.M. at 484, 660 P.2d at 126.
50. Id. at 485, 660 P.2d at 127.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 490, 660 P.2d at 132.
53. See supra note 48.
54. 99 N.M. at 487, 660 P.2d at 129.
55. Id. at 488, 660 P.2d at 130.
56. Id. The court also reiterated the holding in McElhinney v. Kelly, 67 N.M. 399, 356 P.2d 113
(1960), stating that although N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-502, supra note 48, requires that the execution
of a will be done with the testator and witnesses all present at the same time, § 45-2-502 has been
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Additionally, the court of appeals held that it is not essential for a
document to recite expressly that it shall take effect only at the death of
the testator, if the instrument and circumstances under which it was written
reasonably indicate that the testator intended the document to be testa-
mentary in character. 57 The court also stated that extrinsic evidence gen-
erally is admissible to establish testamentary intent in an instrument,
which on its face is ambiguous as to whether the decedent intended it to
serve as a testamentary document.58
In Kelly, the court of appeals interpreted for the first time some trou-
blesome language in New Mexico's will execution statute. The case
indicates that publication is required when a testator directs another to
sign a will for him, and that it is not essential for a will to recite expressly
that it shall take effect only upon death, if other circumstances indicate
that the document was intended to be testamentary. Despite these clari-
fications, however, New Mexico still requires strict formality in the sign-
ing and witnessing of wills.59
interpreted so as not to require the witnesses to see the other witnesses sign, but merely that they
be in the line of sight, so that they could have seen one another had they looked. 99 N.M. at 488,
660 P.2d at 130.
57. Id. at 489, 660 P.2d at 131.
58. Id.
59. For a thorough discussion of New Mexico's will execution statute, see Flickinger, Intestate
Succession and Wills Law: The New Probate Code, 6 N.M.L. Rev. 25, 35-40 (1975).
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